









and Michael C. Keeley
- REMINDER. free
15 deadline to contlfiUe your
If you missed the August our address label (with correc-
. t·on please send us Y subscnp 1 ,
tions) by October 1.
Nominal Feedback Rules for Monetary Policy
Why Banks Need Commerce Powers
Can Bank Capital Regulation Work?
• Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking
• A Reexamination of Mean-Variance Analysis
of Bank Capital RegulationNominal Feedback Rules for Monetary Policy
John P. Judd and Brian Motley
Vice President and Associate Director ofResearch, and
Senior Economist. We would like to thank the editorial
committee, Mark Levonian, Chan Huh, and Jonathan
Neuberger, as well as Bharat Trehan and Carl Walsh for
valuable suggestions. We also wouldliketo thankRosalind
Bennett and Michael Weiss for research assistance and
Carol Healey for preparing the document.
We assess empirically how a particular setofmonetary
policy rules (suggested by Bennett McCallum) would
operate in the transition to zero inflation, andin maintain-
ing price stability thereafter. We do this through repeated
stochastic simulations ofprice and nominal income rules
within three different models ofthe economy. The price
rule leads to instability in some models. However, the
nominal income rule consistently works with high proba-
bility to reduce inflationfrom present levels to zero infive
years, without significantly raising the probability ofa
recession. That rule also would ensure price stability in
the long run, butpossibly at the expense ofslightly more
volatility in real GNP.
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It now is widely accepted both outside and inside the
Federal Reserve that price stability is the appropriate long-
term goal of U.S. monetary policy. This view has been
advocated by a substantial part of the economics profes-
sion for a long time. The issue recently became the subject
of Congressional debate when Representative Stephen
Neal proposed that the Congress instruct the Federal
Reserve to adopt policies to lower the inflation rate to zero
within five years, and to maintain constant prices there-
after. I This proposal was endorsed by Federal Reserve
Chairman Greenspan and a number of Federal Reserve
Bank Presidents (Greenspan 1989, Hoskins 1989, and
Parry 1990).
Despite the consensus on price stability as the main
long-term goal ofmonetary policy, the stabilization ofreal
economic activity remains animportantshort-termgoal for
most central banks. The desire to achieve both of these
goals inevitably raises the issue of which should take
precedence at any particular point in time. Most econo-
mists would agree that monetary policy tends to have an
inflationary bias unless some institutional structure is in
place to ensure that the monetary authority achieves its
long-term goal ofprice stability. This consideration raises
the long-standing issue of rules versus discretion in the
conductofmonetary policy. 2 Proponentsofmonetary rules
argue that unless the monetary authority is required to
achieve prescribed values of a nominal variable under its
control (such as a monetary aggregate or the monetary
base), long-run price stability goals inevitably will be
sacrificed for short-run income stabilization objectives.
The main argument against rules, and in favor of discre-
tion, however, stems from the belief that following a rule
would increase short- to intermediate-term volatility in
output, which is considered undesirable.
With the possible exception of three years in the early
1980s, the Federal Reserve has employed a highly discre-
tionary approach in conducting policy. Since the move
away from the monetary targeting procedures used from
1979 to 1982, Federal Reserve policy actions have re-
sponded to a wide range ofeconomic indicators, including
inflation, economic activity, the exchange rate, interest
3rates, money, and other financial variables (Heller 1988).
Even though the Fed still establishes annual ranges for two
Illonetaryaggregates (M2 and M3) and a credit aggregate
(total nonfinancial debt), these ranges are not consistently
binding on its day-to-day operations. Thus, the process of
formulating and executing monetary policy in the U.S.
currently lacks an explicit nominal target that ensures that
discretionary policy actions taken in response to short-run
developments do not take aggregate demand offcourse in
the long-run.
In this paper, we review the theoretical arguments for
adopting rules for policy, and assess empirically how a
particular set ofrules would operate both in the transition
to zero inflation and in the longer run after that transition
has been completed. The rules we examine are feedback
rules of the type proposed by Bennett McCallum (l988a,
1988b), in which the central bankadjusts the growthrate of
the monetary basein response to observeddeviations ofthe
level of nominal income (or some alternative nominal
variable) from established target values. In order to assess
the risks of adopting different rules, we use numerous
stochastic simulations to determine the range ofoutcomes
for real GNP and prices that we could expect ifthese rules
were implemented and the economy experienced shocks
similar in magnitude to those in the past. Finally, we use
simulations of three different economic models to reflect
the alternative paradigms that currently have significant
followings among macroeconomists (as discussed in Man-
kiw 1990). Giventhe intense theoretical debate going on in
the macroeconomics profession, a rule should not be given
serious consideration unless it is robust across alternative
theories.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section I presents a brief overview of the literature on
the theoretical basis for monetary-policy rules, and the
advantages and disadvantages of alternative target vari-
abIes. Section II discusses the nature of, and rationale for,
McCallum's nominal feedback rules. Section III presents
the empirical results. The conclusions we draw from these
simulations are presented in Section IV.
I. The Role ofMonetary Policy Rules
The basic argument in favor of rules in the conduct of
monetary policy is that discretion leads to time-inconsis-
tent results. Even if the monetary authority has the same
objective function as the general public and acts to maxi-
mize that function at every point in time, the results ofits
actions will be suboptimal in the long-run. The central
bankwill produce more inflation (but no more real growth)
expostthan was desiredex ante (see Barro 1986, Barro and
Gordon 1983, and Kydland and Prescott 1977). This result
holds even if the central bank maximizes an objective
function that assigns negative weight to inflation while
putting positive weight on output above its full-employ-
ment level.
The key assumptions underlying thisresult are that there
is a positive relation between monetary policy surprises
and deviations of output from its full-employment level,
and that the public's expectations eventually are consistent
with the policy followed by the central bank. Thus, the
public can be "fooled" only temporarily. The assumption
that the public cannot be fooled permanently means that
outputcannotdeviate from its full-employment level in the
long-run, and therefore, that social welfare is maximized
by producing zero inflation. Under these circumstances,
therefore, if the monetary authority were to adopt a long-
run policy rule, it would choose one that produced zero
inflation.
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At any point in time, however, the monetary authority
takes the public's prevailing inflation expectation as a
datum. Thus, if it is not bound by a rule, the monetary
authority can add to social welfare in the short-run by
generating a policy surprise that raises output above its
full-employment level. Butin the long-run, the authority is
unable to raise utility by producing surprises because on
average, real GNP cannot be raised above its full-employ-
ment level.3 Indeed, since the average rate of inflation is
raised by the authority's discretionary actions, social wel-
fare is actually reduced by the discretionary approach
compared with the situation in which a rule is imposed.
The extentofthe inflationary bias in discretionary policy is
affected by the central bank's rate oftime preference. The
more weight it places on near-term, relative to more
distant, developments, the larger is the inflationary bias.
If it is to solve the time-inconsistency problem, a rule
must commit the monetary authority permanently and in
advance. This would ensure that the public would believe
that the rule would be followed into the indefinite future
andwould form its expectations accordingly. The rule must
be stated in terms that the monetary authority is capable of
achieving, since otherwise the policymaker cannot be held
accountable. For this reason, proposals have been made to
requirethe central bank to stabilizethe growth rateofsome
easily observed and measured variable that is under its
Economic Review / Summer 1991direct control, such as the monetary base or the narrow
money stock. Friedman's (1960) constant-money-growth
rule was an early example of a time-consistent policy
commitment.
Contingent rules, so long as they can be clearly defined
and enforced, also could solve the time-inconsistency
problem. Forexample, inprinciple, a time-consistentnom-
inal rule thatalso specifies how the growth ofthe monetary
base temporarily would respond to business cycles might
reduce short-run swings in the economy while at the same
time ensuringthat money growthwould be noninflationary
over time. However, it may be difficult to enforce con-
tingentrules, since the monetary authority may be tempted
to "cheat" onits longer-run price stability condition in the
expectation that the public will be unable to distinguish
between cheating and allowable responses to changes in
cyclical conditions. Thus it is especially important that
contingent rules be specified in terms of an easily ob-
servable variable that clearly is under the control of the
central bank.
Alternative Nominal Targets
Most analyses ofmonetary policy rules have begun with
the presumptionthatthe target shouldbe money, especially
Ml. The narrow money supply is appealing because it can
be controlled reasonably well by the central bank and
becauseail credibletheoretical models view money growth
as the unique causal factor in steady-state inflation. How-
ever, uncertainties about movements in the velocity of
money in the short to intermediate run, related to the
deregulation of the financial system, have been a central
feature ofthe U.S. economy and monetary policy since the
early 1980s (Simpson 1984). These developments have
raised serious doubts about the practical usefulness of
money as a target ofmonetary policy.
These concerns about instability in velocity have moti-
vated proposals that the Fed should target nominal GNP.
Thus, this variable has been seen as a second-best solution
to the velocity problem (Hall 1983 and Tobin 1980).
Targeting nominal GNP would get around the problem of
velocity instability, since the money supply automati-
cally would accommodate shifts in velocity under this
approach.4
The following identity illustrates how nominal income
targeting can be used to achieve price level objectives:
where p = log ofprice level
x = log of nominal income
y log ofreal GNP
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
As this identity shows, a predictable relationship between
nominal income and the price level depends upon the
predictability ofthe level ofreal GNP. According to some
analyses, the level ofreal GNPhas along-run trend, called
potential GNP, which is determined by long-run supply
conditions in the economy, including labor force growth
and trend productivity (Evans 1989). Under this hypothe-
sis, these factors evolve gradually overtime, and thus trend
GNP growth should be relatively easy to predict; that is, it
is "trend-stationary." To the extentthat this is the case, itis
straightforward to calculate the path of nominal GNP
required to achieve long-run price stability.
However, Haraf(1986) cites evidence that real GNP is a
nontrend-stationary time series. Ifthis were the case, and
nominal GNPgrew at a constantrate, the price level would
evolve as a random walk, and thus could drift over time.
This problem would arise if real GNP were affected by
supply shocks that had permanent effects on the level of
real GNP. As can be seen in the above identity, under
nominal income targeting, a positive (negative) supply
shock, which brings about apermanentincrease (decrease)
in output, will induce an unnecessary price level decline
(increase). Such responses can be detrimental to macro-
economic performance by raising uncertainty about the
level of prices in both the short and long run. Unfor-
tunately, statistical tests are not capable of distinguishing
accurately between random walks and trend-stationary
processes with autoregressiveroots closeto unity (Mankiw
1989). Thus, there is some inherentuncertainty concerning
possible problems caused by the behavior ofreal GNP for
nominal income targeting.
In partbecauseofthis concern, anumberofauthors have
argued that the Federal Reserve should target prices di-
rectly (Barro 1986 and Meltzer 1984), since under this
approach the price level would not be affected by the time-
series properties ofreal GNP. No matter what time-series
properties real GNP displays, direct price level targeting
obviously could avoid long-term price level drift. The
majorpotential disadvantage ofprice level targeting is that
in sticky price (Keynesian) models, attempts by monetary
authorities to achieve a predetermined path for prices
involve very sharp movements inrealGNPin the shortrun,
which may not be desirable (Hall 1983). Essentially, if
prices are sticky, policy actions have theirlargest effects on
output in the short run. Of course, in flexible price (real
business cycle) models this would not be a problem be-
cause prices would be able to adjust to policy changes in
the short run, requiring no adjustment ofoutput.
Concerns about volatility in real GNP motivate the so-
called modified nominal income target proposed by Taylor
5(1985), which is defined as the inflation rate plus the GNP
"gap" (the difference between real GNP and its full
employment level). This target differs from the others
discussed above in that it uses the inflation rate rather than
a nominal level. Thus it does not prevent the price level
from drifting upward or downward in the long run. For
example, if the inflation rate were to rise, the modified
nominal income targetwould call for a tightening ofpolicy
only until the inflation rate returned to zero, whereas the
nominal income and price targets would require a longer
period of tightening until the previous price level was
restored. However, modified nominal income may have an
advantage over the two other targets discussed above in
terms ofreal GNP volatility. Taylor (1985) shows that, in
the contextofarational expectations Phillips curve model,
the rule would cause less volatility ofreal GNPthan would
a nominal GNP rule.
II. McCallum-Type Rules
The preceding discussion makes it clear that the choice
of a nominal target variable cannot be determined from
theory alone. This choice depends on such factors as the
time series properties of real GNP and the degree of
flexibility ofprices. An empirical investigation is needed.
McCallum (1988a, 1988b) has examined the empirical
properties of operational versions ofnominal income and
price rules. These rules specifY a long-run equilibrium
growth rate for the monetary base plus a rule for adjusting
quarterly growth in the base in response to deviations
betweenthe actual anddesired values ofthe target variable.
They may be written in the form:
(1) !lbt = [!lp/ + !lyn - !lvt + A[Zt-l - Zt-d
where bt = log of the monetary base, Pt = log of price
level, y = log of real GNP, Zt = log of target variable,
* denotes a value desired by the central bank, and
1
!lvt = (16) [(xt - I - bt - I ) - (xt - I? - bt - 17)]·
The left side of(l)represents the growthrateofthe mon-
etarybase, whichserves as the policyinstrument. Theright
side has three components. The first term represents the
growth rate ofnominal GNPthe central bankwishes to ac-
commodatein the long run, which is equal to the sumofthe
desired inflation rate (!lp *) and the steady-state growth
rate ofreal GNP (!lyn. The second component, !lv, sub-
tracts the growth rate of base velocity over the previous
four years, and is designed to pickup long-run trends in the
relationofbase growthto nominalGNPgrowth.5 Thethird
term specifies the feedback rule determining how base
growth is adjusted when there is a target miss in the
previous quarter. That miss is defined as [Z~-l - Zt-I],
whiletheterm Adefines the proportion ofthe miss the cen-
tralbankattempts to offseteachquarter. As such, values of
Xcan be chosen by the central bank between 0 and 1. In
steady-state, the feedback term drops out (since z* = z),
and the rule simply states that !lbt = !lPt* + !ly{ - !lvt.
McCallum's rules use the monetary base as the operat-
6
ing instrument on the grounds that it can be accurately
controlled by the central bank on a day-to-day basis, and
that this controllability is unlikely to be upset by financial
or regulatory innovations. Thus, when the base is used
as the policy instrument, the public can easily observe
whetherthe centralbankis adhering to its rule and canhold
the central bank accountable for its actions. This feature
has the advantage that it provides an opportunity for the
central bank to develop credibility with the public. Such
credibility may substantially lower the costs, in terms of
lost economic output, ofreducing inflation (see Blackburn
and Christensen 1989).
A drawback to using the base as an instrument is that its
velocity has tended to be unstable following the deregula-
tion of the financial system in the 1980s. However, two
features of the rules under investigation tend to mitigate
the adverse effects of instability in velocity. First, the !lvt
term accounts for gradual movements in the relationship
between base growth and macroeconomic developments.
Second, under McCallum-type rules, shifts in the base
velocity are automatically offset by policy. For example, if
base velocity unexpectedly rises, nominal income will rise
relative to the target, which will induceacontractionin the
base growth rate under the McCallum rule. This contrac-
tion will tend to bring nominal income back to its target.
OneofMcCallum's main objectives is to testtherobust-
ness of the nominal income rule across alternative eco-
nomic theories, which have different implications for the
correlations among !lb, !lp, and fly in the presence of
shocks. He argues that neither theory nor evidence points
convincingly to anyone of the competing models of the
dynamic interaction between nominal and real variables.
Because ofthis uncertainty about the true structure ofthe
economy, the monetary authority should adopt a rule that is
likely to work well in a variety of different economic
environments. McCallum tests his proposed rule by
conducting counterfactual simulations under several alter-
native macroeconomic models. The rule is designed to be
Economic Review / Summer1991model-free: that is, the monetary authority responds to
observed deviations from the target, and does not need to
base its actions on forecasts or judgments that would
require knowledge ofthe structure ofthe economy. McCal-
lum's empirical results suggest that ifthe Fed hadfollowed
the rule from 1954 to 1985, there would have been less
cyclical variability in nominal GNP and essentially zero
inflation, and that this conclusion holds true for all of the
models tested.
McCallum, of course, recognizes that these results are
subject to the Lucas (1973) critique: the estimated param-
eters in the models he estimates and simulates might have
changed significantly if the Federal Reserve actually had
followed the rules being tested. McCallum (1988a) at-
tempts to deal with this issue in two ways. First, he cites
Taylor's (1984) finding of parameter stability across the
Fed's policy regime change in 1979, and argues that the
Lucas critique may not be empirically important in the
contextofmonetary policy rules. Second, he substantially
alters the coefficients in one ofhis e~timated models, and
shows that the simulation results are qualitatively un-
changed (McCallum 1988a, pp. 192-194).
Extensions ofMcCallum's Exercise
We extend McCallum's results in a number of direc-
tions. First, we consider another target variable in addition
to nominal GNP and the price level, n3..t-nely, Taylor's
modified nominal income rule. Thus, three alternative
short-run target variables for the policy rules are con-
sidered: nominal income (equation 2), the price level
(equation 3) and modified nominal income (equation4). In
addition, "no rule" simulations also are computed, in
which the monetary base followed the same path as in the
historical sample period:
(2) flbt = [fly{ + flp7] - flvt + }..[x;-I - xt-d
(3) flbt = [fly{ + flp7] - flvt + }..[P;-I - Pt-d
(4) flbt = [fly{ + flp7] - flvt
+ }..[lY{-I-Yt-l) + (flp; l.:..flPt-I)]·
Second, we conduct repeated stochastic counterfactual
simulations ofthe alternative models and rules. In McCal-
lum's simulations, the monetary authority is assumed to
face. the same set of shocks that actually occurred in the
historical period. Below, we assume only that the shocks
have the same means and variances as the historical
shocks. Thus, ratherthan computing a single simulationof
the economy under each rule, we obtain a probability
distribution ofalternative outcomes based upon numerous
sets ofshocks. This enables us to compare different rules
in terms ofthe full range ofalternative outcomes that each
might produce. Third, we examine how adoption of vari-
ous rules might affect the volatility of real GNP. Since
concerns about such effects seem to be a major reason that
many central banks hesitate to adopt rules, we focus agood
deal ofourattention on this issue. Finally, we examine how
alternative rules might be used to bring the inflation rate
down from its level in recentyears tozerooverthe five-year
horizon specified in the Neal Amendment.
III. Empirical Results
Each of the policy rules was simulated under three
alternative sets of assumptions about the structure of the
economy: a Keynesian (or Phillips curve) model, a real
business cycle model, and an atheoretic vector autoregres-
sion (VAR). 6 We closely followed McCallum in specifying
andestimating these models, and ourestimates are closeto
those reported by McCallum (1988b). As will become
apparent, the models are not attempts to describe the
structure ofthe economy as precisely as possible. Rather,
they incorporate the fundamental features of the various
macroeconomic paradigms, and are meant to illustrate the
basic nature of the responses of the economy to the
implementation ofthe monetary-policy rules tested.
The Keynesian model consists ofthree equations. First,
the real aggregate demand equation embodies the direct
effects ofmonetary (and fiscal) policy on macroeconomic
activity. It specifies the growth rate of real GNP as a
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function of current and lagged growth rates of the real
monetary base, real government spending (g), and its own
lagged values (our estimates of the parameters of this
aggregate demand relation are shown inequation Al ofthe
Appendix):
! J
(5) flYt = i~1 (XiflYt-i + j~O Pj(flbt_j - flpt-)
The supply side of the Keynesian model is a simplified
Phillips curve, which embodies the essential "sticky-
price" characteristic ofthe paradigm. It specifies that the
current inflation rate depends on past inflation and the gap
between actual and full employment real GNP (see equa-
tion A2 ofthe Appendix):
7N M
(6) f:..Pi = n~ohn(yt-n - Y{-n) + m~lkmf:..Pt-m' level of real GNP; see equation A5 in the Appendix for
econometric estimates):
the vie\lJ that nominal Gl'lP or modified nominal Gl'-.JP
might be a better target variable, since neither requires
such precise short-run control ofthe price level.
Thereal business cycle model consistsoftwoequations.
First, the price determination equation is obtained by
inverting equation (5) (see equation A4 in the Appendix):
-1 f (X-
(8) f:..Pt = (~ ) f:..Yt + i~1 ( ~~ ) f:..Yt-i + f:..bt
J 13_ K 'Yk
+ j~1 ( 13~ ) (f:..bt_j - f:..Pt-) + k~O ( ~o ) f:..gt- k ·
This specification of the price equation follows from the
assumption that prices are flexible and that real GNP is
independent of aggregate demand. Thus inflation is di-
rectly determined by current and lagged values of mone-
tary base growth, real GNP growth, and other variables.
Real GNP is determined by a simple time series model,
which is consistent with movements in real GNP being
determined by permanent technology and labor supply
shocks. Thus equation (9) specifies that real GNP has a
unit root (that is, shocks have a permanent effect on the
The coefficients on lagged inflation (km ) are constrainedto
sum to 1, thus ensuring that, in steady state, real GNP will
be equal to its full employment level, and inflation will be
constant. Equation (7) defines yf , which is the log offull
employment real GNP and is measured as the fitted values
ofa log linear time trend (T) ofreal GNP (see equation A3
in the Appendix):
(7) y{ = I) + ~Tt·
In combination with anyone of the policy rules that
defines the growth rate ofthe base, equations (5), (6), and
(7) can be simultaneously solved for values of f:..p, f:..y, yf,
and f:..b as functions ofthe monetarypolicy target andother
variables. For the purpose of evaluating monetary policy
rules, the essential feature ofthis model is that monetary
policy affects real GNP with relatively short lags, while
inflation is affected with long lags. This means that at-
tempts to exert precise control over inflation in the short
run inevitably involve a high degree of volatility of real
GNP. As noted above, it is this concern that has motivated
L
f:..Yt e + l~l f.Lz f:..Yt-z· (9)
Simulating the Models
Two basic questions were addressed with dynamic
simulations of the estimated models. First, how would
the principal macroeconomic variables (real and nominal
GNP, prices and the inflation rate) have evolved over the
historical sample period (1954 to 1989) if the monetary
authority had followed each of the three policy rules
throughout that period? We label these simulations as
"counterfactual experiments." The policy rules in these
simulations were specifiedto attemptto hold the pricelevel
constant at its level in 1954. For each rule, within the
context of each model, we calculated 500 simulations in
which the shocks had the same variances as the errorterms
Any of the monetary policy rule equations and equations
(8) and (9) can be solved for values of f:..p, f:..y, and f:..b as
functions ofvalues ofthe monetary policy target and other
variables. For present purposes, the key features of this
model are that prices respond immediately to changes in
the base and real GNP is unaffected by monetary policy.
Thus, short-run control ofprices is much more appealing
than in the Keynesian model. Furthermore, the distinction
between controlling prices and nominal income is nonexi-
stent, since real GNP does not respond to monetary policy.
Thus the Keynesian and real business cycle models
make opposite assumptions about the responsiveness of
prices and real GNP to monetary policy actions. The
Keynesian model assumes that real GNP responds rela-
tively quickly but that prices lag; the real business cycle
model, however, assumes that prices respond quickly but
that real GNP does not respond at all. By testing the
various rules in both models, we have encompassed the
broad range ofassumptions that potentially could be made
in this regard.
In addition to the two models just discussed, we also
conducted simulations using a four-variable VAR that
included growth rates ofnominal GNP, the price level, and
the base, as well as the level ofthe Treasury bill rate (see
Appendix A for estimation results). In simulating this
model under a policy rule, the estimated equation for the
base was replaced by the equation defining the policy rule.
The VAR embodies no theoretical restrictions, and there-






8 Economic Review / Summer 1991inthe respective modelequations.7 Eachsetof500simula-
tions is called an experiment. We calculated a 95 percent
confidence interval for each ofthese experiments.
Second, how might the economy evolve in the future if
the monetary authority adopted a policy rule beginning in
1990 with the objective of lowering inflation gradually to
zero by 1995 and holding the price level constant there-
after? For these disinflation experiments, we assumed that
the shocks to aggregate demand and aggregate supply in
the future would have the same variances as in the estima-
tion sampleperiod. Again, we calculatedconfidence inter-
vals based upon 500 simulations for each experiment.
Counterfactual Experiments
In presenting the results from simulating the alternative
rules, we focus on three measures of economic perform-
ance that shouldreflectthe concerns ofpolicymakers-the
price level, the rate of inflation and the short-run growth
rate ofreal GNP. Ideally, a policy rule should deliver low
inflation, in both the short run and long run, without
causing unacceptable volatility in real GNPgrowth. Given
the conventionaldefinition ofarecessionas two quarters of
declining GNP, we focus on the (annualized) two-quarter
growth rate ofreal GNP.
Table 1 shows the performance of the various rules in
stabilizingthe price level by reporting the 95 percentconfi-
dence intervals for average annual inflation over 1954.Q1
to 1989.Q4. With some notable exceptions discussed be-
low, adoption oftherules couldhave stabilizedprices inthe
long run. In most cases, the confidence bands center
around an average inflation rate near zero.8 Moreover,
these confidence bands are in most cases much narrower
underthe rules thanunderthe policy actually followed over
the period (the "no rule" case). For example, in the
Keynesian model with A = 0.25, average inflation would
have been between -0.67 and +0.48 percent (with 95
percent probability) under a nominal income rule, but
between 2.60 and 5.89 percent with no rule. Only the
modified nominal income rule under the real business
cycle model produced confidence bands widerthan the no
rule case. This resultconfirms our speculationthatthis rule
would allowthe pricelevel to drift inthe long runbecauseit
targets the short-run inflation rate rather than the price
level. Price level drift is especially acute in the real
business cycle model because ofits unit root in real GNP.
Several of the experiments summarized in Table 1pro-
duced explosive cycles in the economy. In particular,
althoughthe priceruleworks well in the real business cycle
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model with its flexible prices, it produces instability in the
"sticky price" Keynesian model. The modified nominal
income rule works well in the Keynesian (Phillips curve)
context, for whichitwas designed, butcausesinstabilityin
the VAR.9 In fact, only the nominal income rule with
cautious policy responses (I\. = 0.25 and0.50) was stable
in all three models.
Thus the results of these simulations show that the
nominal income rule is more robust across alternative
models than are the price and modified nominal income
rules. Within the context of uncertainty about the true
structure of the economy, the nominal income rule is the
only one tested that is not explosive in any of the macro
models (for suitably small values of 1\.) and so could be
considered a viable approach for policy. To illustrate the
effects of this rule (with I\. = 0.25), in Chart 1 we have
plotted the 95 percent confidence intervals for the price
level. In all ofthe models, the confidence intervals center
throughout the simulation period on·a price level near its
level at the beginning of the period, and the confidence
bands are relatively narrow. For comparison, the 95 per-
cent confidence interval for the no-rule simulations, with
the monetary base taking on its actual historical values,
also are plotted. These results suggestthatbyfollowing the
nominal income rule, monetary policy could have avoided
the inflation that occurred over this period with high
probability.
As noted in the introduction, one reason often given by
central banks for not taking advantage of rules to control
inflation is that nondiscretionary approaches tend to create
volatility inrealGNP. To address this issue, Table2reports
the 95 percent confidence intervals for the two-quarter
growth rate ofreal GNPfor the year1989, under the rules
inthe three models andfor the no rulecase. Since the width
ofthe confidence intervals varies somewhat over the sim-
ulation period, we show the results for 1989 as a represen-
tative year. In evaluating these results, we use the no rule
case as a basis for comparison, since it is anestimate ofthe
confidence band that actually obtained over the sample
period under the policies followed by the Fed. Of course,
the rules have no effect on real GNP in the real business
cycle model. In most other cases, the bands are wider
underthe rules than inthe no rule case, implyingthatrules-
based regimes may increase the short-run volatility ofreal
10 Economic Review / Summer 1991GNP. An exception to this conclusion is the modified
nominal income rule in the Keynesian model. However, as
noted above, this rule produces unstable results in the VAR
and very wide confidence intervals for inflation under the
real business cycle model.
Rules that Explicitly Attempt to Smooth Real GNP
In an attempt to find a rule that might reduce short-run
real income volatility in the Keynesian model and the
VAR, we experimented with a rule in which the monetary
authorityresponded both to the level ofnominal GNP(as in
the nominal income rule) and to the growth rate of real
GNP relative to its growth rate in the recent past.10 In
steady state, this rule would yield the same results as the
nominal income rule, but it would induce a stronger
response to temporary fluctuations in real GNP growth:
- A[dYt-l - ( ~ ) q~l dYt_q] ,
with Q equal to 20 quarters.
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We also tried a rule thatreplaced the growth rates ofreal
GNP in equation (IO) with levels, so that the final term in
the equation was: -A[Yt-1 - Y{-d. However, we found
that both nIles produced somewhat wider fluctuations in
real GNP than the simple nominal income rule in the
various models. These attempts obviously do not eliminate
the possibility that some other specification would reduce
real GNP volatility, but at least these simple, straightfor-
ward approaches do not seem to do the job.
Disinflation Experiments
In this section, we report the results of simulating a
policy rule specified so as to lowerthe inflation rateto zero
within five years. We chose this time interval because the
Neal Resolution proposes this objective for the Federal
Reserve. In view ofthe results ofthe counterfactualexperi-
ments, these disinflation simulations were computed only
for a nominal income rule with Aequal to 0.25.
In these simulations, the policy rule (equation (2» was
specified so that both the equilibrium growth rate of the
base (db* = dp* + dyf ) and the targeted level of
























1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
A= 0.25 Nominal GNP Rule
inflationoveraperiodoffiveyears. This requires thatAp*
declinegradllallyJromtheactualinflationrate inJ989to
zero in 1994.Q4. Frolll1994.Q4 pllwarda.p* = 0, and
thus.Ab*.= a.yf. Atthesallle.time, the target level of
nominaJGNP(xT-l)is setequal to theactual laggedvalue
ofnominalGNPinJ990.Ql,afterwhichitgrows atarate
thatdeclines steadilyuntil, after twenty quarters,itgrows
ata.yf.
The re~~ltspfthis.simulationare.shown in Charts 2
through 4./Chart2sho\Vs.the path ofthe inflation rate
underthe rule in the threealtemativemodels, while Chart
3 sQows theresultsfortheprice level. Thesecharts suggest
thatinallthreemodels,adoptionofthe rule would have a
good chanceofreducing illflationto zero within five years
and ofmailltaininggenerallystableprices thereafter. The
confidence.bands for inflation are wide because they apply
to inflation rates in individual quarters. However, the
relatively narrow bands in the price level charts make
it clear that average inflation over an extended period of
time would be held close to zero with a high degree of
confidence. 11
Chart 4 shows the simulated two-quarter GNP growth
rate in the three models. Even during the period in which
the inflation rate is being brought down, there is a better
thaneven chance that arecessioncanbe avoided. Although
the mean simulated GNP growth rate declines below the
trend growth rate in the early years of the simulations, it
does not become negative. Perhaps more significant is the
observation that the confidence intervals on real GNP
growth are no widerduring the periodin which inflation is
coming down than they were during the historical sample
period. Thus a policy of aiming for zero inflation by
following anominal incometargetingpolicyrulewouldnot
significantly worsen the probability ofthe economy falling
into a recession.
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Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco 13III. Conclusions
In this paper, we have extended the work of Bennett
McCallurn.onthe usefulness ofnolllinalfeedbackrulesfor
linking short-run monetary policy actions to the goal of
achieving and maintaining price stability. Given present
uncertainties about the structure of the economy, these
rules are designed to be modeHree; that is, the monetary
authority does not needtorely ona model to implement
thern,andtheyperlormwelLinseveralpossiblemodels. In
addition, therulesareop~r<\tion<\linthe.sense that they
define movements in a variable (the monetary base) that
canbe controlled by the central banle
We have ex,aminedthe propertiesofthree• s"Uch rules~
withshort-runtargets ofnominalGNP, theprice level, and
inflation plus the GNP "gap"-in the context of three
alternative views ofthe structure ofthe economy. Ourtests
involved numerous stochastic simulations ofthese models
and rules. We examined the behavior of prices and real
GNP during a transition from the current prevailing infla-
tionrate to price stability, andduring an extendedperiodin
which price stability is maintained.
This analysis leads us to a number ofconclusions. We
find thatthe nominal income rule is successful at maintain-
ing price stability, in the sense that at the end of the
simulations, 95 percent confidence intervals for the simu-
lated price level are centered on the level of prices that
existed at the beginning of the simulation period. More-
over, the nominal income rule provides tight confidence
intervals, suggesting a high level ofcertainty about where
prices will end up under the rule.
The price level and modified nominal income rules
produce dynamic instability in some ofthe models tested.
Only the nominal GNP rule, with relatively cautious ad-
justmentparameters of0.25 and0.50, was nonexplosive in
all the models. Giventhe uncertainty aboutwhich model is
most appropriate, this would appear to be the only rule
14
testedwith suffidentrobustnesstobeconsideredseriously
as a target. This rule, however, does present the problem
that it appears to increase real income volatility in some
models. In interpreting the results for real income v<\ri-
ability, however, it is important to. bear in.rnindthat the
estimates we have obtained probably represent .upper
bounds on the detrimental effects offollowing the rules.
These roles most likely.would have. beneficial effects on
Fed credibilityand would reduce uncertainty in the econ-
omy, .which most likely would have beneficial effects on
real.income volatility (Blackburn and Christensen 1989).
These.beneficial effects are not captured in our simula-
tions, and we havenowayofmeasuring theirsignifiCance.
Finally, we simulated the possible effects of·moving
from the present inflation rate to zero inflation in five
years. We limited theseexperimentstothe nominal income
rule for reasons given above. Under all three models, this
rule achieved zero inflation in five years in the sense that
theconfidence intervals for inflationwere centeredonzero.
Moreover, even withoutbeneficial credibility effects, none
of the models suggested that the disinflationary process
would noticeably increase the chances ofa recession com-
pared with the experience over the past 35 years under
actual policy.
Thus, our results suggest that the nominal income rule
could work effectively in reducing inflation from current
rates to·zero. Moreover, this rule would ensure price
stability thereafter, although possibly at the expense of
more volatility in real GNP. Whether a rule seems worth
trying (ex ante) depends on how important achieving and
maintaining zero inflation is to the policymaker, compared
with the possible benefits of attempting to smooth real
GNP. This paperhas attempted to put some parameters on
the nature of the tradeoff the policymaker would face in
making this choice.
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1. This legislation was called the "Zero-inflation" Amend-
ment, H.R. 2795, 101st Congress, 1st session.
2. See Englander (1990) for a review of these issues and
an extensive bibliography.
3. This argument assumes away the possibility that the
central bank may be able to use discretion to reduce the
size offluctuationsof real GNP around its full-employment
level. If this were possible, and if stability had utilityforthe
publiG, then there could be some positiveutiiity from
discretion in the long"run, which couldoffsetthe loss of
utility from higher inflation.
4. Hence, Tobin's observation that nominal income tar-
geting is nothing but "velocity-adjusted moneytargeting."
5.. McCallum selected the 16-quarter average to be long
enough to avoid dependence on cyclical conditions. As a
consequence, the term can take account of possible
changes in velocity resulting from regulatory and tech-
nological sources.
6. McCallum also examines the properties of a rational
expectations inflation surprise model (Lucas 1973). We
decided not to pursue this approach because it no longer
receives much support from macroeconomists.
7. In the Appendix, we reproduce some of McCallum's
simulation results. Following his approach, in this table we
used only one set of shocks, equal to the actual historical
errors in the estimated equations. Our results are similarto
his.
8. The simulation of the V}i,R under the nominal income
rule produced a gradual decline in the price level. At the
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
same time, the model predicts that real GNP would have
risen more rapidlythan actuallyoccurred historically. This
result impliesthatto producezero inflation, the rule should
have specified a faster steady-state growth rate oUhe
base. It appearsthatthe VAR model embodiesaninverse
correlation between the inflation rate and the real GNP
growth rate. This correlation also is found in Lebow, Rob-
erts, and Stockton (1990) and Selody (1990VThus if the
growth rate ofthe base is reducedtoholddowninflation,
thetrend growth rate of real GNPishigher.Oneofthemain
arguments in favor ofprice stability is that itwquld boost
real growth by facilitating long-range planning and elim-
inating the need for economic agents to waste resources
in efforts to avoid the effects of inflation. The VAR appears
to be consistent with this view. By experimentation, we
found that if the base growth rate was set to prOduGe zero
inflation, the trend GNP growth rate was 4 percent,rather
than the actual trend rate of 2% percentover the historical
sample.
9. Simulations also were computed with an inflation rule,
but this procedure produced instability in all models and
so was abandoned.
10. Recall that policy does not affect real GNP in the real
business cycle model.
11. Prices are more volatile in the real business cycle
model than in the other models, because holding nominal
income stable implies that independent fluctuations in
real GNP are mirrored in opposite fluctuations in prices.
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ay ap R db
ay 0.300000 0.700000 0.005000 0.018000
ap 0.300000 0.000015 0.091000 0.180000
R 0.000016 0.035000 0.000000 0.000000
db 0.007800 0.008000 0.051000 0.000000
R2 0.300000 0.673000 0.930000 0.710000
SEE 0.008400 0.003900 0.95ססOO 0.003700
Q 23.920000 38.910000 34.990000 29.880000
D.E 120 124 119 121
+ 0.30 aYt- I
(3.60)
Aggregate Supply:






(Al)aYt = 0.0044 + 0.26 aYt-1+ 0.25 (dbt- apt)
(4.64) (3.29) (2.17)







The variables in the regressions below are defined as follows:
b log ofmonetary base
(adjusted for reserve requirement changes)
g log ofhigh-employment government expenditures
P log ofGNP deflator
log of 3-month Treasury bill rate
Y log ofreal GNP
yf = log ofreal GNP trend
T = time trend
(A2) ilpt = 0.026 (Yt-Y{)+ 0.35 apt-l+ 0.23 !i.Pt-2
(2.71) (4.22) (2.66)
+ 0.23 apt-3+ 0.20 apt-4
(2.46) (2.38)












Real Business Cycle Model
Aggregate Demand
(A4) apt = 0.017 3.94aYt + 1.01aYt_1
+ abt + O.72abt_ 1 O.72apt_1






Thrgets Keynesian Cycle Autoregression
Nominal GNP "-=0.25b 0.0268 0.0167 0.0237
"- = 0.75 0.0171 0.0115 Explosive
Price Level "-=0.25b Explosive 0.0161 0.0293
"-=0.75 Explosive 0.0080 0.0490
Modified "-=0.25 0.0279 0.0317 Explosive
Nominal GNP "-=0.75 0.0196 0.0240 Explosive
aShocks equal residuals in estimated model equations.
bSee Tables 1and 2 in McCallum (l988b).
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